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The history of fire science originates in the desire to enhance destruction of 
infrastructure by means of fire. Many of the basic principles of fire growth and the 
behaviour of structures in fire were developed within the context of an organized and 
deliberate attempt to use fire as a tool for urban destruction. Buildings are inherently 
vulnerable to fire due to their use, thus they have to be designed with the objective of 
minimizing the probability of fire occurrence and of damage potential. Nevertheless, 
the design criteria rely mostly on scenarios that are considered to be consistent with 
the building use. Within the design process there is no consideration to premeditated 
fires or those corresponding to a strategy for destruction. Furthermore, generally 
design is done in a prescriptive manner and thus is framed by rules and regulations 
that do not provide an estimate of performance.  Only a detailed understanding of the 
performance of a building or structure in the event of a fire can allow estimating and 
understanding its vulnerabilities and can result in a strategy to minimize the impact of 
fire as a tool for terrorism. 
 
Introduction 
 The introduction of practises that result in an increase level of safety dates 
probably to ancient times. Observations of the devastating effects of fires lead from 
very early on to the establishment of prescriptive requirements. These requirements 
can stand on very basic principles such as building separation and maximum escape 
distances or on more complex specifications like the need for sprinkler systems and 
compartmentation. These requirements became formalized at the beginning of the 20th 
Century in a series of codes and standards. A good example is the fire resistance 
standard test methods and the “Standard Fire” curve embedded in it. This standard 
prevails as a commonly used method to assess the performance of structural elements 
in a fire [1].  The first building codes in the USA where developed after the Baltimore 
Fire in 1904. Since then, institutions like the National Fire Protection Association 
(NFPA) and Underwriters Laboratories have guided the development of codes and 
standard test methods, NFPA started in 1896 and Underwriters Laboratories in 1900. 
A similar history can be constructed for many countries.  Since its initial 
formalization “fire safety” has been prescriptive, and despite the technical origin and 
empirical observations supporting most standards, these are incapable of assessing the 
performance of a building in the event of a fire. Instead they assume adequate levels 
of safety based on the scientific and empirical information that forms the basis to the 
codes.  Clearly, scenarios that escape the experiments that support the standards result 
in undefined safety levels. 
 Systematic generation of scenarios that escape the prescriptive design 
specifications became a destruction tool during World War II and the origin of 
modern fire science. Hoyt Hottel describes in great detail the process that lead to the 
establishment of active fire research programmes at Harvard and MIT, in the United 
States, as part of the war effort and with the specific objective of maximizing urban 
destruction via fire [2].  Hottel indicates that a meeting of the National Defence 
Research Committee convened by the presidents of Harvard and MIT in 1941 
concentrated on the replacement of magnesium and rubber-thickened naphtha as 
incendiaries and on the radiative ignition of wood.  This meeting lead to what might 
be considered one of the first 20th Century explicit scientific publications on fire 
research [3].  A number of well known discoveries followed this initiative, among the 
best known is the generation of Napalm by Louis Fieser (Harvard University). 
Already, by 1942, gasoline thickeners such as Napalm where being tested to 
demonstrate their fire setting potential on wooden structures.  Architects Mendelshon 
(of German Background) and Raymond (with 18 years of practice in Tokyo) where 
then summoned to carefully design structures that resembled those present in German 
and Japanese cities.  Careful attention was given to between floor and ceiling cinders 
developed in Germany to stop the lateral spread of fire.  Test of incendiary bombs 
were carried on these structures in May 1943. Similar studies where simultaneously in 
progress in Britain under Professors Finch and Egerton at Imperial College.  
 Wartime events show that society has recognized the potential of fire as a tool 
for deliberate destruction and as a mechanism to undermine morale. Furthermore, it 
brought top scientist to recognize this potential and devote their careers to the study of 
fire. The war effort focused on destruction was thus followed by a peace effort 
focused on understanding, controlling and preventing fires.  In 1956 a Committee on 
Fire Research was formed bringing Professor Howard Emmons from Harvard 
University, a participant of the war fire research programme, into the centre of post-
war fire research. Howard Emmons is now regarded as the father of modern fire 
science.  The efforts of Howard Emmons lead to the Fire Research and Safety Act of 
1967 and the formation of the Fire Centre at the National Bureau of Standards.  A 
similar process followed the war in the United Kingdom through the Fire Research 
Station at the Building Research Establishment (BRE) and in Japan through the 
Building Research Institute (BRI). Notable are the scientific contributions of Thomas 
and Kawagoe. 
 The post war efforts lead to dramatic progress in the understanding of fire and 
the recognition of the vulnerabilities inherent to prescriptive design of infrastructure. 
Scientifically based tools that quantify fire growth, its impact on buildings, fire 
detection, smoke management and suppression followed [4]. These tools strengthen 
the believe that building design can include elements of performance.  Thus 
performance-based design alternatives for fire have been subsequently included in 
many legal frameworks around the world [5].  Performance based design has the 
capability of enabling predictions of the behaviour of a building in the event of any 
particular scenario, therefore is ideally suited to lead to solutions that respond well to 
premeditated fires, resulting arson, war or terrorism. This paper will discuss the 




Principles of Performance Based Design 
It was indicated above that from the perspective of a Fire Safety, the design of 
a building can be approached in two different ways. The first is for the building to 
comply with existing regulations, and the second one is to achieve certain safety 
goals. Regulations have not been developed to fully specify the design of unique and 
complex buildings such as high rise buildings and even, in the event that they existed, 
they are of questionable effectiveness. Furthermore, if a scenario such as the one of 
September 11th, 2001 needs to be considered as a possible event during the life of the 
building, design on the basis of safety goals is the only path that can be followed. This 
section will illustrate a simple framework that describes the concept of performance-
based design for fire. 
The schematic presented in Figure 1 could represent the behaviour of a 
building in the event of a fire. It could be argued that the safety objective should be 
that the time to evacuation (te) at each compartment (i.e. room of origin, floor, 
building) be much smaller that time necessary to reach untenable conditions in the 
particular compartment (tf). Characteristic values of te and tf can be established for 
different levels of containment, room of origin, floor, building. Furthermore, it is 
necessary for the evacuation time to be much smaller than the time when structural 











Although these criteria for safety times can be considered as a simplified statement, it 
is clear that it describes well the main goals of fire protection. 
With the objective of achieving these goals a number of safety strategies are 
put in place. These include those strategies that are meant to increase tf which include 
active systems, such as sprinklers, or the intervention of the fire service. As shown by 
Figure 1 (dotted lines), success of these strategies can result in control or suppression 
of the fire. Passive protection such as thermal insulation of structural elements 
becomes part of the design with the purpose of increasing tS. Finally, but most 
important, evacuation protocols and routes are designed to minimize te at all stages of 
the building. It is important to note that within the estimation of te the safe operations 
of the fire service need to be included. 
The events following the attack on the World Trade Center showed that these 
safety goals were not attained and illustrated why it is essential to have the best 
possible understanding of how structures will behave in the event of a fire. For this 
purpose an adequate understanding of the nature of the possible event and the 
characteristic of the structure and its safety systems is necessary.  This requires a 
detailed understanding of the fire conditions, the interactions between the fire and the 
structural elements and the sequence of the intervention and evacuation processes. 
Different methodologies and tools have been developed to study each of these aspects 
and to quantify the different values to te, tf and tS, nevertheless many gaps of 
knowledge are still evident.  
 
 
Figure 1 Schematic of the sequence of events following the onset of a fire in a multiple story 
building. The thick line corresponds to the “fire size,” the dotted lines to the possible 
outcome of the different forms of intervention (sprinkler activation, fire service). The 
dashed lines are the percentage of people evacuated, with the ultimate goal of 100% 
represented by a horizontal dashed line. The dashed & dotted line corresponds to the 
percentage of the full structural integrity of the building. 
 
Current Engineering Methodology 
Disasters, whether natural or manmade, are a test to design practices and in 
many cases prove the vulnerability of our infrastructure. Disasters force us to revisit 
our perception of the safety inherent to the environment in which we carry our 
everyday activities. Therefore, associated to disasters there is always anxiety and 
pressure to revisit those practices that lead to unsatisfactory performance. The 
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behaviour of structures in a fire has faced, in the events of September 11th 2001, one 
of those disasters that have directly challenged our current design practices. Anxiety 
has spread over those individuals linked to infrastructure that can be considered as 
potential targets for terrorist activity. As we understand more about what happened 
with the World Trade Center Buildings questions are being raised about our current 
design practices, proposed amendments and the tools that we use to evaluate the 
performance of structures in the event of a fire.  Furthermore, as mentioned before, 
the collapse of the World Trade Center buildings 1, 2 and 7 occurred within a period 
where design practices were being pushed out of an environment of prescriptive 
requirements to one where structures will be evaluated on the basis of their 
performance as predicted by engineering tools. 
 To analyse the response of the designers to this disaster it is necessary to pose 
a series of questions. The first question relates to the actual nature of the disaster that 
is provoking the reaction. Why did these buildings collapsed carrying the lives of so 
many people? The answer to this question will be the product of a forensic 
investigation [6] that we do not intend to discuss here. Nevertheless, from this 
investigation will result different conclusions, some pertaining to the nature of the 
event, some pertaining to the nature of the buildings themselves and some pertaining 
to the design and construction practices involved in the development of these 
buildings. The latter point is the one of greatest interest to the public since it is 
associated to the safety of current and future buildings designed under the same 
principles. Significant information on the advantages and limitations of current design 
practices has already emerged from this introspection. The general question then 
becomes: in which way is fire incorporated into the design of structures?  This 
question is then followed by a series of interrogations that relate to the details of the 
design practice, which are of a more fundamental nature but still directly concern the 
safety of our built environments. 
 Deepening into the detailed processes, a fire affects a structure through the 
heat it supplies to all the constructive elements. Thus the first pillar of a design 
process is the understanding of the fire, the growth process it undergoes and the heat it 
supplies to the structural elements. In other words, the different values of tf need to be 
quantified.  As much as it is clear to everyone that a fire affects a structure, it is not as 
common to understand how a structure can have an impact on the growth of a fire. 
Nevertheless, it is the case that as the structure heats-up energy will be provided by 
the structural elements to the fuels enhancing the rates of fire growth. Furthermore, 
deformation and failure of different structural components will affect the air supply to 
the fire and consequently the heat released. As a result structural and fire behaviour 
are coupled (tS and tf depend on each other). Once the relationship between the fire 
and the structural elements has been defined it is important to understand how the 
structure will react to that external heat input. Material properties will change and it is 
accepted that all parameters describing the material strength will deteriorate, but this 
is only one part of the process. The geometrical features of structures are also affected 
by fire since materials expand with temperature and the constraints inherent to the 
geometry of the structure result in significant generation and redistribution of stresses. 
 Once these fundamental questions have been addressed it is important to 
establish sources of uncertainty. Uncertainty or “error” can range from the purely 
probabilistic nature of the fire event to deterministic estimation of the variability of 
the thermal properties of insulation materials used for fireproofing. The combination 
of analysis on the basis of fundamental physical principles, simplifying assumptions 
and error estimates represent the design tools. Structural Fire Safety Engineers have 
numerous tools that can provide quantitative estimates of the performance of a 
structure in the event of a fire (i.e. tS).  
The design tools used by engineers address the different aspects explained in 
the previous paragraph. It will be the designers’ hope that all these tools were based 
on sound and fundamental engineering principles and that the answers obtained were 
exact thus include no potential for “error” or “variability.” The reality is that fire and 
structures are very complex problems whose complexity increases exponentially 
when coupled. No tool can solve the integrity of the structures in fire problem, thus all 
tools rely on a number of assumptions. Many of these assumptions have been 
thoroughly studied, their error bars established and their results validated. Therefore, 
it has been the believe of the designer that the tools provide accurate and robust 
results that have been the basis of the design process.  
The progression towards performance and the precedent set by the collapse of 
the World Trade Center buildings require from the engineer to revisit the design 
procedures and the tools with the objective of improving, modifying and gaining 
confidence. The following paragraphs will schematise design practices commonly 
used and present those areas that are being revisited through fundamental research. 
Table 1 provides an attempt to schematise some of the design methods 
commonly used to analyse the performance of structures in the event of a fire.  The 
design framework defines a sequence of events. The architects provide a design from 
which the structural engineers will develop a structural analysis that will take into 
account all requirements that will guarantee that the building will support its own 
weight and perform adequately to its intended use. The architectural design and 
structural analysis do not include at this stage the potential for a fire. Any 
considerations for fire introduced by architects at this point are mostly associated with 
prescriptive requirements but include no evaluation of the impact that these measures 
can have on the structure’s performance. Once the structure has been designed the fire 
needs to be incorporated. This can be done either through prescriptive requirements 
that are fundamentally based on the use of the building or through an engineered 
analysis of structural performance. The former provides no indication of the 
behaviour of the structure in the event of a fire thus is unsuitable for any event that 
will escape the range covered by the historical data that support prescriptive design. 
An important aspect of the latter methodology is to establish a design fire. The choice 
of design fires can be achieved in a number of different ways. It could include a series 
of most probable events, “worst case scenarios” or could lead to the definition of 
protection systems and maintenance protocols that will constrain the fires to an 
acceptable level.  The main limitation of the “Design Fires” is that any event (i.e. 
terrorist attack, arson) that escapes the chosen range of fires could lead to an 
unacceptable performance. A further limitation of this approach is that definitions 
such as “worst case scenario” or “most probable event” are difficult to establish. The 
outcome variables such as structural behaviour, life safety, property damage are all 
coupled and in most cases a function that minimizes all negative outcomes is not 
possible. Probability based decisions are limited by then lack of a comprehensive set 
of statistics. Fires are, by definition, rare events. Given a building, its usage, its life 
and the potential threats, it is for many cases difficult to establish a probability 
database that gives adequate confidence.    
 Given the “Design Fires” a series of sophisticated tools can be used to 
establish the growth of the fire and its impact on the structure. The main constraint of 
these tools is associated to the interface between the fire and the structure. Most 
models are computationally intensive therefore solutions are obtained for the fire 
without accounting for the structure and the impact that its heating can have on the 
fire. Furthermore, close to the interface there is significant uncertainty associated to 
the performance of these tools. Finally most tools treat fire protection devices, such as 
sprinklers or smoke extraction systems, in a very crude manner. 
 The coupling of the structure and the fire is then done in an artificial manner. 
The classical approach is to test each individual element against a standard fire curve 
and obtain a rating that indicates the time lag until the structural element reaches a 
pre-defined critical temperature. Time to failure is the fine when an individual 
component reaches the critical temperature. The test could be substituted by 
calculations that use as input the standard fire (ISO-834 [1]), “parametric curves” [7], 
or the output of the calculations performed from the design fires.  It has long been 
recognized that fires are affected by multiple factors, thus a single “standard fire” 
does not suffice. On the basis of this, time equivalences between the standard tests, 
the “parametric curves” and “computed fires” can be established [8].  The last stage of 
the design process is to introduce fire proofing to obtain the desired rating. Numerous 
methods exist to establish the required insulation [9] but they all imply a component 
of empirical data and uncertainty.  As indicated in Table 1, this component of the 
design process has strong limitations and represents a very active area of research. 
These limitations and the proposed solutions will be discussed in a later section of this 
paper. 
The above description clearly establishes areas where improvements can be 
made and that represent the new face of structural design for fire.  There is a strong 
evolution towards an integrated design process that incorporates fire behaviour into 
the architectural and structural design processes. The benefits of this approach are 
significant because it allows optimisation of the structural design to meet the 
architectural, structural and fire safety needs. To achieve integration it is necessary to 
address areas where the tools are not coupled, one important area is the interface 
between the structure and the fire. Numerical models used to predict structural 
behaviour and methods to quantify fire growth are being coupled to encompass the 
dynamic interactions between the fires and the structures [10].  Furthermore, 
optimisation of fire growth models has become necessary given the constant evolution 




Tools Assumptions Limitations 
Architectural Design 





Finite Element Numerical Simulations 
Structural design is conducted 
without the inclusion of a fire 
The global evolution of the structure 
with the fire is not included as part of 
the evaluation of the design 
alternatives 
The uncertainty in the properties 
necessary for the calculations 
increases because high temperature 
data is limited and not-well-
understood phenomena such as 
“spalling” needs to be included. 
Historical evaluation of occurrence 
probabilities 
Analytical tools to quantify fire growth 
Numerical Simulations of Fire Growth 
(Zone Models, CFD Models) 
Empirical/Analytical/Numerical methods 
to analyse heat input to structures 
Design Fires 
Fire Protection Methods (i.e. sprinklers, 
fuel control, venting) to define fire 
scenarios 
The structure is design to fit a 
fire that has a high probability of 
occurrence. 
The definition of the fire is 
given on the basis of an assumed 
performance of a multiplicity of 
elements (i.e. smoke evacuation, 
sprinklers) 
 
Ignores events that escape the pre-
defined scenarios.  
The performance of these fire control 
elements has been defined only for a 
reduced number of conditions. 
Standard testing of individual 




Parametric Curves for more realistic 
scenarios 
The fire can be defined  by a 
standard Temperature vs. Time 
curve. 
The test furnace (ISO-834 [2]) 
provides a realistic 
representation of a fire. 
If the standard fire is deemed 
not to represent the “Design 
Fire” an equivalent Rating can 
be extracted from a different 
Temperature vs. Time curve 
(parametric curves) 
The feedback from the structure 
to the fire can be ignored. 
Failure is defined by attainment 
of a critical temperature of an 
individual structural element. 
Does not address the fundamental heat 
transfer mechanisms controlling heat 
exchange between a fire and a 
structure 
Ignores the impact that geometrical 
effects have on structural behaviour 
(i.e. restraint thermal expansion) 
Time equivalencies are only valid for 
a very small set of conditions, many 
unrealistic to fires  
Fire 
Protection 
Fire Proofing to achieve required Fire 
Ratings 
Properties of insulating material 
are well characterised 
An adequate extrapolation from 
furnace test behaviour to a real 
fire can be expected. 
Application, maintenance and 
life time have no bearing on the 
performance of fire proofing 
There is not enough data to support 
the assumptions. 
Furnace can only be extrapolated to a 








The Broadgate Phase 8 fire in London, UK and the subsequent Cardington 
frame fire tests have allowed researchers to fully investigated and understand the 
behaviour of whole frame composite steel-concrete structures in response to fire [11, 
12, 13]. In June 1990 a fire developed on the first floor of the 14-storey Broadgate 
building.  The total duration of the fire was in excess of four-and-a-half hours, with a 
severe period for about two hours.  Flames temperatures in excess of 1000°C were 
noted.  The structure of the building consisted of composite steel deck/concrete floors.  
The steel structure was partially unprotected at this stage of the construction.  Despite 
some large deflections, there was no collapse of any of the columns, beams, or floors.  
The Broadgate fire prompted BRE to conduct a large-scale test program on an 8 
storey composite steel frame at their test facility in Cardington, UK. The Cardington 
Frame fire tests provided a wealth of experimental evidence about how whole frame 
composite steel-concrete structures behave in fire. The main conclusions were that 
composite framed structures possess reserves of strength by adopting large 
displacement configurations with catenary action in beams and tensile membrane 
behaviour in the slab [12, 13]. Furthermore, for most of the fire duration thermal 
expansion and thermal bowing of the structural elements rather than material 
degradation or gravity loading govern the response to fire. Large deflections were not 
a sign of instability and local buckling of beams helped thermal strains to move 
directly into deflections rather than cause high stress states in the structure. Only near 
failure, gravity loads and strength will again become critical factors. These findings 
and the additional motivation provided by the WTC collapses have resulted in drastic 
shift of the design process, away from fire resistance principles and towards a global 
structural analysis. Broadgate and WTC show two different potential outcomes that 
can only be predicted via a detailed global analysis of the structural behaviour through 
the fire event. 
The need to use “Design Fires” still remains an unresolved problem. The 
volume of the calculations required to address the different aspects of a fire implies 
that only a reduced number of scenarios can be fully studied, thus educated 
engineering solutions are still necessary.  Important strides are currently being made 
to optimise the necessary tools to allow for a more systematic evaluation of a 
multiplicity of scenarios where the “Design Fires” can be substituted by concepts such 
as design to obtain a “Minimum Damage Potential.”  
The concept of a “Minimum Damage Potential” implies a systematic 
evaluation of the different physical variables that will control the growth of a fire, the  
 
Current Practises and Environment 
In the realm of fire safety, two distinct areas emerge, fire safety systems and 
structural fire safety. Fire safety systems include detection, suppression and smoke 
control systems as well as evacuation. Structural fire safety concerns the integrity of 
structural elements in the event of a fire. Building authorities will have to approve 
these designs thus justification for all departures from prescriptive rules will have to 
be justified and understood by those in charge of approval. Engineered solutions 
require deep understanding of all physical principles underpinning the design 
methodology as well as the modern tools used in the process of design (CFD Fire 
Codes, Finite Element Models, Evacuation Models). This level of understanding is 
currently only available to a very reduced number of professionals (for example 
approximately 30 new graduates enter the building-design and construction industry 
per year in the UK [14]).  
Currently, architects receive a very restricted amount of information on fire 
safety matters, most of which is directed towards the understanding of prescriptive 
methods. Structural engineers follow a similar path. Fire Safety Engineers are a small 
minority that will only be consulted once a problem is identified  [15]. Thus most Fire 
Safety Engineering professionals remain either in the Building Control areas, Fire 
Brigades or in consultancies.  The result is an uncoupled approach to the design of 
structures to be fire safe.     
Traditionally it has been assumed once the steel is protected, or enough 
concrete cover is provided, no further response in fire can be expected, nor any further 
improvements can be made to enhance a structures response to fire. But, as mentioned 
above, powerful analytical tools and comprehensive understanding as a result of 
Cardington (tests and modelling)[13] has enabled us to predict structural response to 
fire with a high level of detail evidencing some positive traits on our current design 
practices. The key findings from modelling Cardington were rather unexpected: 
Instead of showing how the declining strength of individual structural elements 
progressively destroys the strength of a frame, the calculations revealed that steel 
frame composite structures of this kind have large reserves of strength through 
adopting large displacement configurations, and that thermal expansion, not material 
degradation was the dominant phenomenon.  This means that structures are far more 
robust in fire than previously understood, and that total reliance on passive 
fireproofing is unnecessary.  Detailing of connections, core construction and design, 
even the span of the structural frame all contribute to the robust response of the 
building in fire. Current code fire ratings are not based on this understanding and as 
such can over or under estimate building safety in fire. 
The realization that the geometrical characteristics of a structure can have a 
significant effect on the evolution of its strength in the event of a fire, opens the door 
to a much closer interaction between architects, structural and fire safety engineers.  
The basic architectural design of the built environment and its interpretation by a 
structural engineer now can be influenced by criteria that will make the structure 
safer. 
Two important conclusions emerge from this new understanding. The first is 
that traditional ratings based on fireproofing and standard testing methodologies [1, 
16, 17] are clearly insufficient when assessing the performance of a structure in the 
event of a fire. Current testing practices deliver information on the thermal behaviour 
of a structural element but do not establish its structural performance. An aposteriori 
analysis of the collapse of WTC 1 & 2 gives a good example of the limitations 
introduced when there is complete reliance on current testing practices [18].   
The second conclusion indicates that an optimal solution can only be achieved 
if building geometry, structural design and fire safety considerations are included 
simultaneously in the design process. This requires convergence of architectural, 
structural and fire safety concepts. Integration of separate disciplines allows the 
development of buildings that are explicitly designed, more robust, more valuable, 
and satisfy better the needs and requirements of clients and society.  It allows these 
integrated disciplines to develop innovative solutions and allows engineers and 
architects with a means of being more valuable.   
It is important to note that both performance based design and integration of 
disciplines comes associated with a drastic increase in the average training provided 
to professionals exercising design and building control. Furthermore, tackling fire 
event in complex engineered buildings require a different level of skills from the fire 
brigade. Thus, in an ironic manner, authorities many times conclude that the elevated 
training requirements for those involved in the process is one of the main 
disadvantages of performance-based design [19] and thus forget that this problem can 
be resolved by consistent investment in higher education and research in this area. 
The accelerating trend to depart from prescriptive regulations towards 
engineering solutions and the reduced number of properly trained professionals has 
begun to worry those involved in the process. A recent Scottish survey [20] of fire 
brigade and building control personnel, fire safety and civil engineering consultants as 
well as architects gave alarming results. When those surveyed were asked if they 
believed that there were sufficient amount of trained professionals to cope with the 
change, 100% of the fire engineers consulted responded that there was insufficient 
number of well trained professionals, 80% of all building control officials indicated 
that not only there was not enough well trained people but they recognized that many 
of those professionals competent in a prescriptive world will be significantly limited 
when addressing complex engineering solutions. A similar response was provided by 
74% of those consulted within the fire brigades.  Interestingly enough 76% of the civil 
engineers and 82% of the architects consulted believed that the knowledge base was 
there and the transition will represent no problem. Given the different training of all 
different groups it is easy to conclude that it is difficult to understand a problem when 
you do not know that the problem exists. Clearly, building designs currently deemed 
to spouse performance principles are being designed as hybrids that are unfortunately 
limited by prescription and by performance, thus the conclusion by Buchanan [17]. 
 
The Potential of Integrated Design in Fire 
Integrated design of structures relies on the definition of built environments in 
a manner that will optimise “use” and “safety.”  Options can be analysed from the 
onset of the design process leading to a sequence of optimal decisions.  The 
advantages of this approach are many.  
• Integrated design allows for simultaneous optimisation of all variables.  
• Architectural concepts can be tested to achieve optimal fire safety and structural 
solutions. Therefore alternate solutions can be weighted in a quantitative manner. 
Therefore, space definition, safety and structural designed can be optimised in an 
integrated manner. 
• It is not constraint by prescriptive design or by any “equivalency” concept. 
Equivalency concepts require engineered solutions to provide equivalent levels of 
safety to prescriptive solutions. Since prescriptive solutions include no estimates 
of performance, this approach is clearly inadequate [17].   
• It eliminates the need for a “design fire” since it allows to define in a parametric 
manner the impact that a fire can have on a specific environment. Currently, 
engineering based solutions require the definition of “design fires” and the evaluation 
of the building performance to these fires.  The choice of design fires could 
include a series of most probable events or “worst case scenarios.” Being able to 
use “building geometry” as a variable allows the choice of modifying the space to 
minimize the potential growth of a fire. Thus a new concept of “minimum damage 
potential” can be embraced. 
• Elimination of the “design fire” and substitution for a “minimum damage 
potential” allows for a better treatment of extreme events. “Design Fires” require a 
“choice” of “extreme events” if their inclusion is explicitly required. The need for 
a “choice” clearly shows the limitation of the approach. Terrorist activities and 
such are designed to lie outside the realm of any forecasted design scenario. As 
mentioned before, a perfect example is the events of September 11th, 2001, where 




Fire is a rare event with a large potential for damage, its low frequency does 
not encourage governments and industry to invest in more adequate tools. 
Nevertheless, the potential for large damage has made fire a favourite tool to inflict 
destruction and weaken morale in the event of a war. These inherent properties make 
infrastructure vulnerable to voluntary fires. 
The last decades have seen the development of sophisticated tools and a desire 
to migrate from a prescriptive to a performance based approach. Fire Safety Engineers 
have in their hands a large number of reliable and sophisticated design tools. These 
tools can still be improved but currently are in many cases appropriate for design 
purposes. Modern structural design for fire is making more and more use of these 
tools.  The advantage of this approach is that it introduces more physical analysis to 
the design process and allows a more adequate quantification of performance and 
uncertainty.  The evolution of design, and of the tools used in the process, is geared 
towards an increase in integration and efficiency and a constant reduction in 
uncertainty and error.  
The current limitations are mostly associated to gaps of knowledge within the 
underpinning processes controlling the behaviour of people and infrastructure in the 
event of a fire. Furthermore, the extreme computational cost of integrated analysis 
results in a need to stipulate “Design Fires.” Design Fires inherently limit the potential 
of the engineered based methodology to address voluntarily induced fires 
Finally, these tools require detailed understanding of the principles 
underpinning them, thus proper training is essential, not only for the designers but 
also for those professionals interacting with Fire Safety Engineers and those involved 
in the approval and inspection process. 
 
References 
1.  ISO. Fire Resistance Test Elements of Building Construction. ISO 834, 
International Organization for Standardization, Geneva. 
2. Hottel, H.C., Stimulation of Fire Research in the United States After 1940 (A 
Historical account), Combustion Science and Technology, vol. 39, pp. 1-10, 1984. 
3. Hottel, H.C. and Wilkes, G., Wood Flammability Under Various Conditions of 
Irradiation, OSRD Publication No. 432, March 3rd, 1942. 
4. Drysdale, D.D. An Introduction to Fire Dynamics, 1st Edition, John Wiley and 
Sons, 1985. 
5. Custer, R.L.P. and Meacham, B.J., Introduction to Performance Based Fire Safety, 
Society of Fire Protection Engineers, 1997. 
6. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). World Trade Center Building 
Performance Study: Data Collection, Preliminary Observations and 
Recommendations. FEMA 403, May 2002. 
7. Petterson, O., Magnuson, S.E. and Thor, J., Fire Engineering Design of Structures, 
Swedish Institute of Steel Construction, Publication 50, 1976. 
8. Law M. A relationship between fire grading and building design and contents. 
Technical Report 1971. 
9. Milke, J.A., Analytical methods for determining fire resistance of steel members, 
SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering, 3rd Edition, 2003.     
10. Torero, J.L. and Steinhaus, T. “Applications of Computer Modelling to Fire 
Safety Design,” 53rd Jahresfachtagung der Vereingung zur Forderrung des 
Deutschen Brandschutzez e. V., Essen, Germany, June, 2004. 
11. Kirby B.R. British Steel data on the Cardington fire tests. Technical report, British 
Steel, 2000. 
12. Bailey C.G. and Moore D.B. The behaviour of full-scale steel framed buildings 
subject to compartment fires. The Structural Engineer. 77(8), pp. 15-21, 1999. 
13. Usmani A.S., Rotter J.M., Lamont S., Sanad A.M. and Gillie M. Fundamental 
principles of structural behaviour under thermal effects. Fire Safety Journal, Vol. 
36, No. 8 pp 721-744, 2001. 
14. Drysdale, D. D., Generating the Graduate Flow, Fire 2004, Manchester, 
September 7th, 2004. 
15. Jackman, P.E., Risk Based Design-Getting Fire safety Engineering Recognized as 
a Profession, Fire 2004, Manchester, September 7th, 2004. 
16. BS 476 : Part 20 : 1987 Fire tests on building materials and structures. 
17. Buchanan, A.H., Structural Design for Fire Safety, John Wiley and Sons, 2001. 
18. Usmani A.S., Chung Y.C. and Torero J.L. How did the WTC towers collapse: a 
New Theory, Fire Safety Journal,  Vol 38, pp 501-533, 2003. 
19. Burd, A., The Regulators View of Performance Based Design, Building Division, 
Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, Rasbash Lecture and ECD Conference, June 
9th, 2004. 
20. McGonigal, J., Evaluation of Building Control Methods in Scotland, Glasgow 
Caledonian University, M.Eng. Dissertation, 2004. 
